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Abstract 
 
The changing nature of diplomacy poses new challenges for diplomatic actors in the 
21st century, who have to adapt their structures in order to remain relevant on the 
international stage. The growing interdependence and complexity of issues 
necessitate a more networked approach to diplomacy, while states retain their 
predominance in diplomacy. The main underlying challenge of modern diplomacy 
therefore requires finding a balance between traditional and new elements. This 
paper examines to what extent the European External Action Service (EEAS) meets 
the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the 
other stakeholders involved, namely the institutions and Member States of the 
European Union (EU). On the basis of a conceptual framework of modern diplomacy 
and an analysis of the different aspects of the EEAS’ structures, the paper argues that 
the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of 
the other stakeholders put constraints on its free development. The latter therefore 
have to choose between irrelevance and integration with regard to EU foreign 
policy and the future of the EEAS. 
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Introduction 
Diplomacy is an institution of international order; it represents ‘a method of political 
interaction at the international level’.1 Several factors, like globalisation, regionali-
sation or localisation, affect this international order and interaction, thereby causing 
new developments in diplomacy. These trends of decentralisation and complexity of 
all levels of diplomatic action pose challenges to the traditional model of state 
diplomacy, thereby changing its character and giving rise to novel kinds of entities 
that partake in diplomacy.  
The European External Action Service (EEAS), a new body of the European 
Union (EU) created by the Treaty of Lisbon, represents one of these novel diplomatic 
entities. However, the EEAS “is not a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs designed to 
replace Member States’ ministries”, as the former High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European 
Commission (HR/VP), Catherine Ashton, pointed out.2 By embodying a new type of 
diplomatic actor, the EEAS is much harder to analyse in terms of the above-
mentioned changes in diplomacy which focus on traditional state actors. Neverthe-
less, this embodiment also underlines the importance of such an analysis, as it 
enhances our understanding of regional or international organisations as diplomatic 
actors.  
The initial perception of a new diplomatic actor, like the EEAS, is that a ‘fresh 
start’ provides the chance to adapt to the new demands of modern diplomacy and 
to avoid the problems of older, traditional diplomatic services in order to become a 
relevant player in global diplomacy. This perception, however, has to be put in the 
context of the diplomatic conduct of the EEAS, taking account of all stakeholders 
and interests involved, since they substantially shape the process of what kind of 
diplomatic system is created. According to David O’Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer 
of the EEAS, the need for EU foreign policy coordination demonstrates a “race 
between irrelevance and integration”. 3  Hence, this dichotomy points to the 
continuity-change nexus which underlies modern diplomacy and necessitates 
balancing in order to cope effectively with the new challenges to diplomacy. That 
means catering for growing interdependence and complexity in an increasingly 
                                                 
1 J.-R. Leguey-Feilleux, The Dynamics of Diplomacy, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009, p. 1. 
2 European External Action Service, EEAS Review 2013, 2013, retrieved 28 December 2013, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf, p. 3. 
3 D. O’Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer EEAS, The Global Positioning of the EU: Where Next?, 
speech, Bruges, College of Europe, 18 March 2014. 
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networked environment, while embracing traditional elements and the state’s 
predominance in diplomacy.  
This paper examines to what extent the EEAS meets the new challenges of 
modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the stakeholders involved. 
The theoretical relevance of this research relates to the effectiveness of diplomatic 
structures that are produced on an intergovernmental level. While the EU represents 
a prime example of the creation and further development of political structures that 
unite very different interests and actors, the EEAS has the potential to become this 
kind of example in the realm of diplomacy. The success of the EEAS could set a 
significant precedent for other regional and global organisations that want to set up 
their own diplomatic systems in the future. Its empirical relevance concerns the 
practical problems that many institutions face in managing complex diplomatic 
situations, especially the EEAS’ dependence on and relationship with Member States 
and other EU institutions. Furthermore, it is an important and interesting endeavour to 
take stock of what the EEAS has achieved in terms of diplomatic conduct before a 
potential remodelling under the new HR/VP. 
The other EU institutions and the Member States influence the EEAS in two 
ways: their turf battles inhibit the constructive development of the Service in many 
regards, while their pooled expertise and united network quality adds to the EEAS’ 
profile regarding modern diplomacy. Considering these diverse interests and the 
involvement of many different stakeholders, the hypothesis arises that the EEAS does 
not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the 
stakeholders involved put constraints on its development. 
 
Structure and Methodology 
In order to answer the research question, a qualitative case-study approach helps to 
analyse the EEAS as a new diplomatic service embedded in a greater institutional 
framework and in complex relationships with the other stakeholders. First, the main 
concepts are clarified: what is diplomacy and how has it changed in the 21st 
century? Second, the structure of the EEAS in relation to the main concepts of 
modern diplomacy and the other actors and interests involved are explained. The 
analysis will show to what extent the EEAS meets the challenges of modern 
diplomacy and how it copes with the diverse interests of the other actors.  
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 In order to provide a comprehensive analysis, different kinds of sources are 
used. The next section follows the framework of ‘Integrative Diplomacy’ of Hocking 
et al.,4 while additional academic literature provides more detailed insights on the 
concepts of diplomacy and its changes in the 21st century. The part on the EEAS 
draws on primary and secondary sources, expert interviews, speeches and lectures, 
in order to provide a more comprehensive picture. Due to its focus on the EEAS as an 
institution responsible for foreign policy rather than as a diplomatic system, 
academic literature has so far left gaps in areas such as the EEAS’ engagement with 
non-state actors, the development of best practice, or the use of social media. Thus, 
these sources help fill these gaps and provide more first-hand insights into the EEAS’ 
work. Three of the interviewees were chosen due to their responsibilities for the EEAS’ 
coordination, communication and foreign policy-making role, while the other two 
represent long-standing officials of the EEAS and the Commission, respectively, 
thereby providing insights into the daily working relations of the two bodies. 
Furthermore, the EEAS officials consisted of former Council and Commission 
employees and seconded staff from the Member States, which adds to the 
representativeness of their statements.  
 
Modern Diplomacy: Defining the Concepts 
This part addresses the theoretical concepts of modern diplomacy, which are crucial 
to the later analysis of the EEAS’ role in meeting the new challenges to diplomacy in 
the 21st century. It explains what diplomacy is, why it changed, and how it has 
changed with regard to four aspects: context and location, rules and norms, 
communication patterns, and actors and roles. The concepts and changes 
presented here are not exhaustive, but they illustrate the most important aspects, 
especially in view of the EEAS’ non-state nature.  
The Nature of Diplomacy  
For a thorough understanding of the changes, the underlying concepts of 
diplomacy and the driving forces transforming the diplomatic environment need to 
be set out, since they constitute the leitmotif of modern diplomatic activity. 
First of all, diplomacy is not equal to foreign policy-making but concerns its 
implementation and potential indirect shaping through the provision of information 
                                                 
4 B. Hocking, J. Melissen, S. Riordan & P. Sharp, "Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy 
in the 21st century", Clingendael Report, no. 1, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, October 2012. 
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and expertise.5 It is important to distinguish between the processes and structures of 
diplomacy; processes are its main functions, whereas structures are the means to 
carry out these functions.6 Representation and communication constitute the two 
main processes of diplomacy. The former relates to the way actors behave towards 
others in the international system, while the latter represents a way to influence those 
others and promote own interests.7 These functions are also essentially linked to the 
access-presence nexus: gaining access to political hubs all over the world in order to 
represent and communicate effectively necessitates permanent presence.8  
Another important nexus concerns change and continuity. While global 
tendencies initiate change in diplomatic activity, the force of continuity also 
influences the development of diplomacy. Thus, modern diplomacy comprises novel 
and traditional elements. 9 The main tendencies that drive change in diplomacy 
consist of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation, thereby creating a form of 
governance that implies greater social connectivity in different locations and at 
different levels.10 While these trends challenge the traditional dominance of the state 
in diplomacy, they also increase the interdependence of different levels of 
diplomatic activity, and therefore the complexity of issues. In this sense, networks 
interlink various actors in institutional or social structures and thereby generate new 
relationships between them, 11  facilitating collective action in order to deal with 
resulting multilevel problems. Coming back to the change-continuity nexus though, 
both traditional ‘club’ and new ‘network’ diplomacy are crucial to deal with the 
complexities of modern diplomacy.12 
 As a result, any actor that wants to establish relationships with others in order 
to promote its interests can undertake representation and communication, set up 
appropriate structures, a diplomatic service and network, and can theoretically 
                                                 
5 Leguey-Feilleux, op.cit., p. 8; A.F. Cooper, J. Heine & R. Thakur, “Introduction: The Challenges 
of 21st Century Diplomacy”, in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2. 
6 B. Hocking, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System”, in Pauline 
Kerr & Geoffrey Wiseman, Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 124. 
7 G.A. Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010, pp. 5-7. 
8 Hocking, op.cit., pp. 135-6. 
9 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 11. 
10  J.A. Scholte, “From Government to Governance: Transition to a New Diplomacy”, in 
Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking & William Maley (eds.), Global Governance and 
Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 42-3. 
11 J. Metzl, “Network Diplomacy”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 2, no.1, 
2001, pp. 77-78. 
12 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 24. 
Juliane Schmidt 
8 
participate in diplomatic activity. Although several forces change modern 
diplomacy significantly, rendering it more networked, interdependent and complex, 
continuity plays an important role as well in the sense that states remain the 
predominant actors.  
Context and Location 
Nevertheless, due to the increased interdependence of actors and complexity of 
issues, the context and location of diplomacy has crucially changed in terms of 
agendas and multilateralism. 
 First, diplomatic agendas developed to incorporate new security threats, like 
climate change, global health risks or terrorism, but also human rights or migration 
concerns since they can stretch over the whole globe and connect different 
actors.13 Diplomacy also became more concerned with regulatory issues, especially 
in the face of the global financial crisis. 14 The solutions to these issues often lie 
beyond the capacity of single states, so that diplomacy must also actively influence 
agendas through thought leadership and advocate collaboration between actors in 
order to find those solutions.15 
 Second, in order to find ways of collective action, multilateralism has grown 
more important since diplomatic actors increasingly partake in multilateral fora to 
make their voice heard and find solutions to common problems.16 Summitry evolved 
as a prominent feature of modern diplomacy; besides regular meetings, top-level 
officials also growingly meet on an ad-hoc basis, generating so-called shuttle 
diplomacy, day trips that do not need permanent presence. 17  Multiple sites, 
including bilateral and multilateral channels, therefore remain significant for 
diplomacy.18 
 Due to the growing interdependence of actors and complexity of issues, 
problems are rarely only domestic anymore but increasingly global in nature, putting 
new security threats and regulatory issues on the global agenda and necessitating 
collective action. The resulting collaboration enhanced multilateralism, but also other 
sites remain significant for diplomatic activity. Thought leadership becomes more 
important than the sole promotion of national interests.  
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp. 13-14; Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 5, 126. 
14 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 5. 
15 Ibid., pp. 20-21, 34. 
16 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 15. 
17 Ibid., p. 18. 
18 Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 22-23. 
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Rules and Norms 
The shift in context and location also challenges sovereignty-based rules and other 
norms. Traditional state diplomacy relies on hierarchical structures, whereas network 
diplomacy implies two-way communication between actors. The development of 
more networked diplomacy allows for the involvement of new diplomatic actors 
which do not fit into the Westphalian system of nation-states.19  
As opposed to traditional norms of secrecy and the legitimacy of diplomats,20 
the growing easy access to information and communication and the shift of 
domestic issues to the international level demand greater openness, transparency 
and accountability regarding the diplomatic profession. 21  However, the right 
balance between secrecy and openness is needed in the age of WikiLeaks, which 
posed questions on secure communication channels. 22  While states draw their 
accountability and legitimacy from their diplomatic history and institutional 
structures, the legitimacy of new diplomatic actors often relies on the collective will 
of the public they represent and the social goals they pursue, but accountability 
becomes a more difficult concept in networks that do not possess clear hierarchies, 
are not elected and sometimes unrepresentative.23  
Furthermore, the increased intermingling of national and global problems blurs 
the dividing line between the domestic and the foreign, thereby undermining the 
special standing of diplomats and their distinctive recruitment and training.24 This 
‘culture of exclusivity’ stemming from certain norms of behaviour and diplomatic 
immunity tends to become more inclusive to admit new diplomatic actors on all 
levels.25  
Nevertheless, although rules of engagement have to adapt to allow new 
diplomatic actors in the diplomatic realm, continuity exists here as well, since the 
most basic rules and norms that underpin diplomacy continue to play a crucial 
role.26 Traditional club diplomacy involves only state actors that belong to a strong 
hierarchy and act according to secrecy norms, while network diplomacy allows for 
                                                 
19 Ibid., pp. 26, 31. 
20 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 24. 
21 Ibid., p. 23; Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 21. 
22 Hocking, op.cit., p. 135. 
23 J.R. Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 
21, 2010, pp. 299-300; Metzl, op.cit., p. 79. 
24 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 26. 
25 Ibid., p. 69. 
26 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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more players in a flatter structure with greater transparency and openness.27 Both 
types face problems of legitimacy and accountability though. The blurring of the line 
between the domestic and the foreign, and the involvement of new actors, 
challenge diplomats’ ‘culture of exclusivity’ and traditional rules of engagement. 
Nevertheless, the basic diplomatic rules and norms uphold continuity and state 
predominance. 
Communication Patterns 
The above-mentioned trends, especially globalisation and with it the development 
of new technologies, also influence communication patterns of modern diplomacy 
whereby networks play a pivotal role. 
New ways of communication allow for a multidirectional flow of information, 
not solely aimed at elites but also at the general public.28 The universal and instant 
access to information diminished the states’ informational monopoly, so that 
diplomatic services have to become more flexible and react quickly.29 Combining 
new technologies with the norm of information-sharing, however, fosters the 
establishment of databases and best practice, to enhance internal access to 
knowledge as well.30  
In particular social media and websites play a crucial role, since their effective 
use helps to target audiences and spread important messages by properly 
interacting with the public.31 This internet-based pattern is coined ‘e-diplomacy’ and 
involves real time communication.32 Web 2.0 or social networking gives the public 
the opportunity to create their own content in a rather informal way. Even the most 
essential diplomatic functions are enhanced by modern technology nowadays, if 
diplomats know how to use them which requires skills and training.33  
Public diplomacy represents the process of influencing groups and interests in 
other countries in order to change the behaviour of an actor. It evolved as one of 
the most vital functions of diplomatic communication, it has to be conducted 
                                                 
27 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 22. 
28 Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 23, 38. 
29 Metzl, op.cit., p. 79; S. Riordan, “Reforming Foreign Services for the Twenty-First Century”, 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, pp. 163-164. 
30 Metzl, op.cit., pp. 81, 85-86. 
31 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 6; K. Hamilton & R. Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its 
Evolution, Theory and Administration, London, Routledge, 2010, 2nd edn., p. 236. 
32 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 34. 
33 J. Kurbalija, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, E-diplomacy: Electronic Tools for 
Diplomats, lecture, Bruges, College of Europe, 23 January 2014. 
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effectively and fully integrated into the diplomatic structures. It also benefits from 
multidirectional communication, as it provides the chance to engage with foreign 
publics and stakeholders, eventually promoting a global open dialogue.34 
 New technologies therefore render communication flows more multi-
directional and immediate. The speed of information flows accelerated, demanding 
instant reactions and higher flexibility of diplomats. In order to have their message 
heard and to remain relevant, they must be the first ones to react and to share 
information. Especially e-diplomacy and public diplomacy play a crucial role in this 
regard.  
Actors and Roles 
The tendencies set out above have had another crucial impact that extended the 
number and variety of actors participating in diplomacy and transformed the role of 
traditional diplomatic services and diplomats.  
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) do not constitute exclusive diplomatic 
actors anymore but networked multi-stakeholder diplomacy has been emerging.35 
Non-state actors have proven very capable of representing and communicating the 
interests of broad publics at the international level and therefore shape policy-
making,36 rendering them crucial participants in modern diplomacy. MFAs have to 
give these actors a forum for making their voices heard.37 Besides their importance 
as advocates of specific interests, non-state actors can be crucial to diplomacy in 
case they can provide pivotal knowledge. Non-governmental organisations, think 
tanks, academic researchers or businesses can often provide expertise and 
information for policy-making that professional diplomats cannot obtain.38 
The blurred separation of the domestic from the foreign realm and the 
increased complexity of issues necessitate coordination between all stakeholders in 
order to foster a ‘whole-of-government’ involvement in the diplomatic sphere. Thus, 
a ’national diplomatic system’ arises that comprises all domestic diplomatic actors, 
with the MFA and its overseas posts as subsystems.39 Even the embassies abroad are 
increasingly staffed with non-professional diplomats from other government depart-
                                                 
34 Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 6, 39; Metzl, op.cit., pp. 85-87. 
35 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 23. 
36 Kelley, op.cit., pp. 288-289. 
37 Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, op.cit., p. 11. 
38 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 35. 
39 Ibid., pp. 5, 53; Hocking, op.cit., pp. 126-127. 
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ments or ministries.40 However, there is not only a tendency of fragmentation but also 
of centralisation, since heads of state and government have acquired more direct 
control over foreign affairs.41 
To cope with the newly emerging global needs, modern MFAs must expand 
their role in providing intelligence and analysis, employing non-state actors’ 
expertise, and being capable to flexibly deal with crises.42 The diplomatic network 
abroad has to report effectively, provide policy advice and handle crises on the 
ground, which could be enhanced through regional ‘crisis hubs’.43  
The most important change in the MFA’s role is therefore the shift from being a 
gatekeeper to an external boundary spanner and internal coordinator. Instead of 
guarding the borders between the domestic and the foreign, MFAs link internal and 
external networks and coordinate all relevant domestic diplomatic actors to provide 
more meaningful input for foreign policy-making.44 Thus, MFAs become more like 
facilitators and entrepreneurs,45 or even like global corporations.46 
The 21st century has seen a rise in the significance of distinct diplomatic 
activities of overseas embassies and missions. A higher demand for stronger trade 
links and advice on how to do business overseas promotes more commercial 
diplomacy, 47  while the steep rise in transnational travel calls for more consular 
diplomacy. However, these also constitute fields in which diplomatic services could 
share burdens. 48  Furthermore, development issues become more and more 
intertwined with foreign policy and therefore move into the diplomatic domain of 
embassies.49  
Considering the shift towards summitry and shuttle diplomacy and the 
resulting perceived redundancy of overseas networks in the access-presence nexus, 
many MFAs had to find ways to deal with decreased resources for their diplomatic 
                                                 
40 Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, op.cit., p. 26. 
41 Ibid., p. 16; Hocking, op.cit., p. 129. 
42 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 56. 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
44 Ibid., p. 23; B. Hocking, “Gatekeepers and boundary spanners: thinking about foreign 
ministries in the European Union”, in Brian Hocking & David Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in 
the European Union: Integrating Diplomats, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2005, p. 11. 
45 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 23. 
46 Hamilton & Langhorne, op.cit., p. 238. 
47 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 15. 
48 Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 6-7. 
49 Hocking, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System”, op.cit., p. 127. 
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systems, 50  such as non-resident ambassadors accredited to several countries, 
operating from regional core embassies, or co-locating missions.51 
The diversification of issues and expansion of diplomatic functions requires not 
only more versatile diplomats but also more personnel and outside experts.52 Hence, 
the profiles for the recruitment of diplomats and their training have also been 
adapted,53 so that the most important discussion revolves around the ‘generalist’-
‘specialist’ dichotomy: in order to cope with the modern diplomatic environment, 
diplomats have to combine both skills. 54  The increased administrative work also 
requires ambassadors to possess significant managerial skills.55 
Consequently, diplomacy is no longer the preserve of the MFA and the 
professional diplomat, as they cannot deal with the emerging interdependent and 
complex issues on their own and need to engage with other actors to pool 
knowledge. The main challenge for the MFAs becomes the incorporation of the 
network of all domestic diplomatic actors and their coordination, but also showing 
more entrepreneurship in policy planning. They are supposed to take on more tasks 
and diplomats must develop new skills to carry them out, whereas their budgets are 
decreasing, leading to more burden-sharing. Despite the proliferation of new 
diplomatic actors though, continuity persists in this regard as well, since states retain 
their importance by advocating the broad interests of their societies.56 
This section explained the nature of diplomacy and the main forces that drive 
its change in four crucial aspects, forming the basic conceptual framework for the 
analysis of the EEAS’ role in coping with the new challenges of modern diplomacy. It 
illustrated an overarching trend of all aspects of diplomatic activity in moving 
towards a more networked type of diplomacy, whereas the persisting predominance 
of the state also reinforces continuity. As a result, the inherent and most important 
challenge for modern diplomatic actors consists in adapting to the changing 
environment in order to remain relevant, thereby combining traditional club with 
new network diplomacy. In this light, also the EEAS has to find the right balance in 
order to meet the new challenges of modern diplomacy, a task which often 
represents a struggle between irrelevance and integration.   
                                                 
50 Ibid., pp. 135-136; Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 24. 
51 Hocking et al., op.cit., pp. 68-69. 
52 Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, op.cit., p. 26. 
53 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 7. 
54 Cooper, Heine & Thakur, op.cit., p. 15. 
55 Ibid., p. 26. 
56 Hocking et al., op.cit., p. 5. 
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Modern Diplomacy and the EEAS: Meeting the New Challenges? 
In theory, any actor has the opportunity to take part in diplomacy by establishing 
relations with others to enhance its position through representation and communi-
cation and by providing the necessary structures. In order to evaluate how the 
features of the EEAS match the changing environment of modern diplomacy, this 
part looks at each of the four aspects of the new challenges. It includes only the 
most important features for the analysis, since the more technical aspects would 
require more detail than the scope of this paper allows for. 
Context and Location of EEAS’ Diplomacy 
The EEAS is trying to form an EU opinion on almost all policy fields of EU external 
action,57 including energy security, climate change, migration, terrorism, or even 
financial regulation, and common positions are achieved more often than not.58 The 
EEAS therefore provides internal thought leadership by setting the agenda for the 
EU’s external action as its main coordinator.59 However, problems of coordination 
and of division of labour arise between the Commission and the EEAS, as the former 
still possesses the main competences and expertise in policy areas like migration or 
humanitarian aid.60 Furthermore, the EEAS does not possess enough resources to 
deal with issues like energy or climate change, which do not officially belong to its 
remit.61  
The EU is committed to effective multilateralism, and the EEAS and the EU 
Delegations coordinate common positions with the Member States on each agenda 
item of a multilateral forum, which sometimes represents the hardest battle and takes 
very long.62 In terms of summitry and shuttle diplomacy, the HR/VP’s role is in no way 
inferior to that of a Foreign Minister.63 Moreover, the EEAS is characterised by a strong 
belief in collective action to tackle global problems.64 Yet, despite the EEAS’ internal 
                                                 
57 EU external action is the umbrella term for all aspects of the EU’s foreign policy.  
58 O’Sullivan, op.cit.; European External Action Service, op.cit., p. 8. 
59 A. Hadfield & D. Fiott, “Europe and the Rest of the World”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 51, Annual Review, 2013, p. 170. 
60 European External Action Service, op.cit., p. 8; R. Balfour & K. Raik, “Equipping the European 
Union for the 21st century”, FIIA Report, no. 36, Helsinki, The Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, 2013, p. 19. 
61 Interview with EEAS official 2, Brussels, 7 April 2014. 
62 Ibid. 
63 European External Action Service, High Representative Catherine Ashton: Agenda, 2014, 
retrieved 1 May 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/agenda/index_en.htm; Art. 27(2) TEU. 
64 C. Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Remarks 
to the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence policy, speech, Brussels, 3 
April 2014, p. 5. 
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thought leadership and increased concern with the new security threats and 
regulatory issues, the fragmentation of competences may hamper the Service’s 
contribution. The EEAS uses multiple sites to emphasise the need for collective action, 
but its participation in multilateralism is hindered by the fact that – as a non-state 
entity – the EU cannot become a member of many international organisations. This 
hindrance points to the EEAS’ dependence on the Commission and the Member 
States and the continuity of the state as the main actor in diplomacy. Despite this 
continuity, the EU and its EEAS represent post-Westphalian actors, thereby 
challenging the Westphalian diplomatic order.  
Rules and Norms of EEAS’ Diplomacy 
Nevertheless, sovereignty remains pivotal with Member States often refusing to take 
a back seat in diplomacy.65 Furthermore, the EEAS diplomats do not enjoy the same 
privileges and immunities as state diplomats, and the willingness of their Member 
States of origin to issue diplomatic passports varies greatly, while simultaneously 
heightening the EEAS’ dependency on Member States.66 
The EEAS’ organisation illustrates a very bureaucratic, top heavy hierarchy.67 
The many layers of management and unclear chains of command negatively affect 
the flow of information between the Member States and the EEAS.68 Many EEAS 
officials complain about a lack of trust from the top management to the system 
beneath and hope for the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, to streamline the current 
pyramid structure and to introduce a more decentralised, bottom-up approach.69  
Although the Member States favour the EEAS’ overall openness and 
transparency, they can also be counterproductive in sensitive areas. On the one 
hand, information is shared with many people and often provided upon request, 
multiplying the chances of leaks; on the other hand, officials regard the emailing 
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67 A.E. Juncos & K. Pomorska, “’In the face of adversity’: explaining the attitude of EEAS 
officials vis-à-vis the new service”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 20, no. 9, 2013, p. 
1337. 
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system as not secure enough and ask for a strengthening of secret communication 
channels.70 Even though the EEAS’ institutional position and staffing enhances two-
way communication with Member States and EU institutions, especially at the lower, 
more informal day-to-day level, the EEAS also struggles to make the Member States 
demonstrate the same openness in information-sharing.71  
The European Parliament has gained considerable rights in scrutinising the 
HR/VP and the EEAS and frequently interacts with them, adding to the Service’s 
democratic accountability and legitimacy.72 Moreover, cooperation with national 
diplomatic services enhances the EEAS’ legitimacy, as this inclusive involvement 
promotes a “sense of joint ownership” of the EEAS among the Member States.73 
The top positions in the Service are held by Member States officials, meaning 
diminished career prospects and constant turf battles which cause frustration among 
EEAS officials and, combined with severe budget cuts, have led to a relatively low 
morale and a strained environment.74 Indeed, the involvement of Member State 
diplomats hampers the development of a common diplomatic culture, as they are 
temporarily assigned and therefore still ingrained with national loyalty.75 The lack of 
common training also inhibits a ‘culture of exclusivity’, since recruitment of policy 
experts without training does not produce professional diplomats.76  
 As a result, the EEAS’ top heavy hierarchy, unclear chains of command and 
lack of trust negatively impact the development of two-way communication, 
whereas openness and transparency enhance it. The wide-spread sharing of and 
often too easy access to information calls for better confidential communication 
channels. The EEAS draws its accountability and legitimacy from the European 
Parliament’s involvement and the Member States’ sense of joint ownership, with the 
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majority of top-level positions filled by Member State officials. This political turf battle 
and the budget cuts cause frustration and low morale, which combined with the 
‘dual allegiance’ problem of Member State officials inhibit the evolution of a strong 
’esprit de corps’. The EEAS does not foster a ‘culture of exclusivity’ since the majority 
of its staff are not professional diplomats and there is no common training. Although 
the EEAS challenges the Westphalian diplomatic order, sovereignty prevails as the 
established international system favours states, underlining the change-continuity 
nexus once again. 
Communication Patterns of EEAS’ Diplomacy 
The EEAS has kept up with the new technologies and its openness and willingness to 
engage with wider publics lays the groundwork for adapting well to the changing 
communication patterns of modern diplomacy. 
The EEAS-Commission working arrangements foster a multi-directional flow of 
information in order to ensure coherence,77 which does not always work without 
problems. 78 On the level of EU Delegations, the EEAS and Member States share 
information and pool political intelligence, often resulting in joint reports.79 Neverthe-
less, the quality and distribution of reports differ greatly from one Delegation to 
another.80 Thus, databases or a system of best practice could be helpful.81 While the 
Delegations provide political reports to all relevant EU institutions, they also receive 
information about new developments or lines to take from them and can access 
press briefings on a daily basis via telephone or video.82 However, the EEAS lacks an 
operational electronic system of information-sharing and archiving, which slightly 
inhibits its work.83  
The Commission provides the EEAS with communication services, such as the 
‘europa.eu’ internet domain or the Europe Direct network for public enquiries.84 
Despite a common template, every unit and EU Delegation is responsible for 
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updating their website, so that the lack of personnel often leads to inactivity. 85 
Generally, the Service makes growing use of its electronic communication services.86  
The EEAS headquarters and an incremental number of its Delegations also use 
social media, but its success greatly depends on the skills, training and even initiative 
of the responsible persons. Thus, due to the lack of human resources and the time-
consuming coordination and approval procedure, the EEAS’ social media sites are 
often less active than those of the other EU institutions. The EEAS mostly posts 
information with links to official documents and fails to interactively engage with the 
commentators.87 Although social media could be used in a more targeted way, the 
EEAS uses its resources effectively to reach wider publics and set up important public 
diplomacy campaigns, mostly at the local level.88 
The EU’s post-Lisbon public diplomacy became more coherent through the 
EEAS and more visible through the HR/VP. The fragmentation of public diplomacy 
aspects (internal in the Commission and external in the EEAS) still poses the main 
challenge for a more consistent and effective public diplomacy. 89  The EEAS 
coordinates the public diplomacy efforts of all EU Delegations by providing general 
guidelines, daily lines to take and other material. 90  It coordinates a coherent 
approach with the Commission and the Member States in Brussels and on the 
ground, which also fosters a pooling of expertise. 91  On the ground, the EU 
Delegations’ resources and staff capacities varies greatly, so that the larger 
Delegations set benchmarks.92 The funding of the EEAS’ public diplomacy represents 
a great oddity though, as the budgetary authority still lies with the Commission.93 
Another challenge is the failure of policy coordination: if there is no coordinated 
message, the EU cannot speak with one voice.94  
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 Hence, the EEAS employs its communication network quite well, exchanging 
information with the other EU institutions and the Member States, while reaching a 
broad public through e-diplomacy and public diplomacy. However, there could be 
more pooling of expertise, better training and the establishment of best practice in 
many aspects, while the structures of public diplomacy are not properly integrated 
into the Service. The EEAS depends on the other stakeholders, and communication 
can only be meaningful if they successfully commit to policy coordination.  
This dependence is further heightened by the EEAS’ formal role of ensuring 
coherence between all stakeholders of EU external action. The EEAS’ main tasks 
therefore involve interacting with and coordinating these stakeholders.  
Actors and Roles of EEAS’ Diplomacy 
The literature and the interviews conducted by the author do not point to a very 
active engagement with non-state actors on the part of the EEAS although the 
interviewees recognised their growing role. On the level of policy planning, the EEAS 
reaches out and is approached by non-state actors, but Member States and other 
European and international partners play a more important role. On the level of the 
EU Delegations, however, the engagement with non-state actors is more advanced 
than in Brussels.95  
The EEAS definitely undertakes a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, as it is 
located at the heart of a network comprising all stakeholders of EU external action.96 
The EEAS relies on the Council of the EU in terms of logistics for high-level events, 
however, the Council’s willingness to cooperate often depends on the Member 
States’ political interest in the subject matter. 97  Thus, Member States remain 
important stakeholders in the field of EU external action with more power than the 
EEAS, but their feeling of control over the latter generates more trust, integration and 
therefore leverage than compared to their pre-Lisbon relations with the 
Commission.98  
The fact that several areas of external action remain in the Commission’s 
domain poses a problem to the coherence of the EEAS’ policies. The fragmentation 
                                                 
95 Interview with EEAS official 1, op.cit.; Interview with EEAS official 2, op.cit.; Interview with 
EEAS official 4, op.cit. 
96 European External Action Service, EEAS Review 2013, op.cit., p. 3; Wouters et al., op.cit., p. 
10. 
97 Interview with EEAS official 1, op.cit.; European External Action Service, EEAS Review 2013, 
op.cit., p. 10. 
98 Interview with EEAS official 2, op.cit.; Interview with EEAS official 3, op.cit. 
Juliane Schmidt 
20 
of policy areas renders the EEAS’ cooperation with the Commission even more 
important, but its quality varies greatly depending on the field,99 so much so that it 
has “proven to be one of the most serious setbacks to the first steps of the EEAS’s 
existence”.100 
The EEAS has become a significant policy advisor who gives guidance to the 
other EU institutions and the Member States. The latter increasingly recognise and 
appreciate this role and even ask for lines to take on certain issues.101 Also the EEAS’ 
function of intelligence gathering has improved, especially through the shaping up 
of political reports from the EU Delegations, a crucial function for the EEAS’ 
entrepreneurial, policy-shaping capacity. 102  So far, the Delegations could not 
expand their own capacity for policy advice and policy-shaping though.103  
The EEAS’ organisation is very different from MFAs, since it incorporates 
functions of defence ministries, crisis management agencies and even corporations 
– the latter through features uncommon for MFAs, like the ‘corporate board’, 
‘managing directors’, open office space, and sharing the building with external 
shops and cafés.104 Crisis management, however, is not yet well enough integrated 
into the EEAS’ structures.105  
The EEAS greatly improved the coordination of EU external action as a focal 
point in the system that involves all relevant actors. 106  Nevertheless, the EEAS is 
located outside the ‘institutional triangle’ and many stakeholders perceive it as 
merely a Service that exists to support their work.107 David O’Sullivan rightly calls it a 
‘toolbox’, as the EEAS comprises the instruments for EU external action; it does not 
replace any other institutions or MFAs but creates a network that makes their actions 
more coherent.108 Many Member States see it as a “power multiplier” or a “vehicle 
for uploading national interests”.109 As such, its role as coordinator becomes most 
pivotal, and EEAS officials even increasingly perceive a steady harmonisation in EU 
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foreign policy and a resulting sense of seeking guidance from the other institutions, in 
order to be consistent in foreign policy-making.110  
As for the role of policy entrepreneur, the EEAS depends on the Member 
States and the Commission, as it often lacks the necessary competences and 
capacities for leadership. The Member States prefer to remain the leaders in foreign 
policy-making, which often undermines the EEAS’ role in this regard.111 Yet, some 
Member States, such as Germany or the Netherlands, would favour a shift of 
competences from the Commission to the EEAS.112 Thus, the EEAS’ entrepreneurship 
in strategic policy planning depends on finding the smallest common denominator 
with the other stakeholders of EU external action.113 
The EEAS is relatively small for catering for the whole EU, at about the size of 
the Belgian or Dutch diplomatic services,114 but considerably larger than those of the 
smaller Member States.115 Considering the cuts to the budgets of MFAs in many 
Member States and the resulting reduction in personnel and embassies during the 
last years, burden-sharing becomes increasingly attractive.116 Smaller Member States 
already benefit from the EEAS’ political reporting and information-sharing. 117 
Nonetheless, it only represents an added value to the Member States and not a form 
of burden-sharing yet, due to the specificities of national interest, language regimes 
and the lack of a truly common foreign policy.118 While not all Member States like this 
idea, since especially the larger Member States link diplomatic presence with 
prestige and power, others favour co-location of their embassies or the placement of 
only one diplomat in the EU Delegations or in the missions of other EU countries.119 In 
addition, the EEAS is not represented in every country in the world, which it tries to 
compensate through Delegations in the neighbourhood.120  
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Commercial diplomacy represents one of the fields in which Member States 
retained their prerogatives.121 Although the shifting of several aspects of the EU’s 
development cooperation to the EEAS has integrated development more with 
foreign policy, the Commission is unlikely to give up more competences in this field, 
especially not the financial aspects, out of fear the EEAS could channel the funds 
into more foreign policy-related projects instead of aid.122 Furthermore, the EEAS 
possesses neither sufficient resources nor expertise to fully deal with consular 
diplomacy at the moment, but it could potentially obtain a more meaningful role.123  
The majority of the EEAS’ personnel does not consist of professional diplomats 
and foreign policy specialists.124 It is mainly the Member State officials recruited into 
the Service who have a diplomatic background, and the EEAS offers only limited 
training. However, especially the Heads of Delegations are overwhelmed by 
administrative tasks, increasingly taking on the function of managers.125 
Even though interaction with non-state actors is still quite low, the EEAS is 
located at the heart of a networked, multi-stakeholder diplomatic system. Its ‘whole-
of-government’ approach features an unprecedented centralisation of EU external 
action but also struggles with a fragmentation of competences. Cooperation with 
the different stakeholders varies greatly in quality and quantity and always depends 
on their willingness. While it performs well in its service and coordinating functions, it 
lacks political entrepreneurship. Thus, it represents a toolbox for EU external action 
but it cannot use these tools at free will, because its capacity for strategic leadership 
is hampered by the interests of the other stakeholders. Despite the increase in 
cooperation and joint action, Member States remain the predominant players in the 
fields of EEAS action, pointing to the change-continuity nexus once more. 
 This section evaluated how the EEAS performs in each of the four aspects of 
the new challenges of modern diplomacy. It has revealed the underlying thematic 
of the EEAS’ dependence on the other stakeholders and the predominance of the 
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Member States in EU diplomacy. This dependence requires a balance between 
change and continuity, and between integration and irrelevance: On the one hand, 
the EEAS has fundamentally changed the EU’s conduct of diplomacy, main-
streaming important tasks into the EU’s remit and giving it more weight. On the other 
hand, the EEAS always has to keep the interests of the EU institutions and the Member 
States in mind, which have a fundamental desire not to be replaced and become 
obsolete in this prominent field. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper examined the extent to which the EEAS meets the new challenges of 
modern diplomacy. The application of the conceptual framework shows that the 
EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy due to its dependence 
on the interests of the other stakeholders.  
The EEAS basically addresses the newly emerging global agenda items at 
multiple diplomatic sites, advocating for collective action. Its unique nature 
challenges sovereignty-based rules, while finding other sources of accountability and 
legitimacy at the same time. Generally, openness, transparency and two-way 
communication are fostered, while the development of a ‘culture of exclusivity’ is 
resisted. The EEAS’ communication patterns are multidirectional and networked, 
employing different media and sharing information and engaging with broad publics 
through e-diplomacy and public diplomacy. While the EEAS starts to develop 
relations with non-state actors, especially on the ground, it mainly interacts with the 
other EU institutions and the Member States. Thus, the EEAS fosters a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach, rendering its coordinating role pivotal in order to cope with 
the fragmentation and centralisation of competences in EU external action. The EU 
Delegations’ reports provide intelligence, benefiting the EEAS policy analysis and 
advice. Its internal structures incorporate crisis management and development, 
resembling a corporation in certain aspects, while the EEAS could gain a more 
prominent role in consular diplomacy as well. Burden-sharing is implemented through 
co-locations or regional hubs. The EEAS unites generalists and specialists, while the 
Heads of Delegations increasingly assume managerial tasks. 
Nevertheless, the EEAS does not address all of the challenges to modern 
diplomacy. It does not contribute enough to the new global agenda items, 
multilateralism and thought leadership. Its structures are very hierarchical, while 
exhibiting too much transparency at times. Its use of social media does not really 
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feature instant reactions and best practice and resources are lacking in the realm of 
information-sharing and e-diplomacy. Furthermore, its public diplomacy structures 
are not integrated enough into the system to work most effectively. The EEAS does 
not make sufficient use of non-state actors’ knowledge. It has not developed as a 
policy entrepreneur, and it is not suitably equipped to properly shape policy and 
exhibit leadership as its competences are at times too fragmented. Commercial and 
consular diplomacy do not fall under the EEAS’ remit yet, and there are more 
possibilities for burden-sharing. The EEAS staff does not combine the versatile skills of 
generalists and specialists in one person, and the training is insufficient to turn them 
into professional diplomats.  
 Considering the relatively short existence of the EEAS, it still follows that the 
Service does not meet all the demands of modern diplomacy but performs rather 
well in the four key aspects, since it manages to find a balance between change 
and continuity by combining traditional club and new network diplomacy elements. 
However, the underlying dynamics of these aspects point to the EEAS’ dependence 
on the interests of the other stakeholders in EU external action and the continuing 
predominance of states in diplomacy. 
 Due to this dependence, the EEAS’ structures and diplomatic conduct always 
take the diverse interests of the involved stakeholders into account. The main point of 
contention manifests itself in the fragmentation of competences in the various areas 
of EU external action and the fact that the EEAS serves several masters. Thus, it does 
not receive a formal role in policy-making but encompasses all foreign policy areas 
to some degree. Furthermore, the budget aspects decided by the Member States 
and the EU institutions constrain the EEAS’ performance in many ways, while the top-
level positions are mostly allocated to Member State officials. Hence, the EEAS’ 
effective diplomatic conduct in all of the four key challenges of modern diplomacy 
depends on the willingness of the other EU institutions and the Member States, while 
traditional state diplomacy remains predominant. 
 As a consequence, this dependence means that the EEAS caters more for the 
interests of the involved stakeholders than the new challenges to modern diplomacy, 
which confirms the hypothesis that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges 
to diplomacy, since the involved stakeholders’ interests put limitations on the free 
development of the EEAS.  
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 Nonetheless, this finding also bears an adverse significance, since it follows 
that the EEAS then meets modern diplomacy’s challenges precisely because of the 
other stakeholders’ willingness to cooperate and to extend rights and privileges to 
the EEAS that it might otherwise not have. Thus, the EEAS could not work as well as it 
does without the other EU institutions and Member States. Considering the balance 
between change and continuity, the predominance of states does not have to be a 
bad thing either. Modern diplomacy contains novel and traditional elements, 
meaning that the EEAS fits well into the sphere of modern diplomacy, by embodying 
this balance. Furthermore, a purely post-Westphalian system might not stand a 
chance on the international stage, as the EEAS draws its prestige, expertise and 
global relationships from the Member States. The EEAS was also not designed as an 
MFA, so it cannot meet some of the challenges by its very nature, since it is supposed 
to add value to the work of the other stakeholders. The EEAS’ role in diplomacy does 
not represent a zero-sum game. However, many players perceive it that way 
because the EEAS’ success in diplomacy depends on the other stakeholders. Thus, 
remedying the EEAS’ shortcomings also lies in their interest. The move towards more 
joint action and coordination is a first step, but it still represents a “race between 
irrelevance and integration”.126 The outcome of this race could depend greatly on 
the new HR/VP Federica Mogherini.  
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